...rendering Xi Jinping Vulnerable
With the fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) scheduled for October, the annual gathering of CCP leaders at Beidaihe is a prelude of what to expect, from the economy to leadership changes. Lianhe Zaobao China news editor Yang Danxu gives her take.
China’s state media released a 500-word report on 3 August, revealing that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi visited experts on summer vacation in Beidaihe — indirectly confirming that the top CCP leaders have entered its annual “Beidaihe time”.
Located in Hebei’s Qinhuangdao, about 300 kilometres from Beijing, Beidaihe is a popular summer retreat in northern China. In 1953, the CCP leadership began working collectively from Beidaihe during the summer, formalising a summer office system. This practice was suspended when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, but resumed in 1984. Several key decisions in the party’s history were made in Beidaihe, including key appointments and political reports ahead of the CCP’s party congress every five years.
This year, the focus of “Beidaihe time” is expected to revolve around the China-US trade war, the Chinese economy, and the upcoming fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP, known as the fourth plenum.
What is ‘Beidaihe time’?
In 2003, during Hu Jintao’s leadership, the summer office system in Beidaihe was abolished, and its political significance diminished. However, the tradition of senior party officials — including some retired leaders — gathering in Beidaihe for a collective retreat from late July to early August has been maintained.
Although no formal meetings are held, top leaders still use the retreat to exchange views on major issues. Before the decline of “gerontocracy” and factionalism, the Beidaihe gathering served as a platform for information sharing, addressing concerns and reaching compromises. In recent years, China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, has established the era of “one position as the highest authority” (定于一尊) and taken full control over key decisions. Nevertheless, discussions during Beidaihe still play a role in coordinating and unifying positions within the party.
This year, the focus of “Beidaihe time” is expected to revolve around the China-US trade war, the Chinese economy, and the upcoming fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP, known as the fourth plenum.
Trade and economy
The third round of China-US trade talks concluded last week in Stockholm, Sweden, with both sides agreeing to extend the “truce” initially reached in Geneva, though the extension still requires final approval from US President Donald Trump.
As the US wraps up tariff negotiations with other countries, which were forced to accept harsh terms, it is clear that Beijing will not agree to a similar outcome. The gap between China and the US on tariff issues remains wide, and the negotiations will only get tougher from here. After using the “rare earth card” to push back against Washington in the earlier phase, China’s leadership now faces key questions before the next round of talks: what can be compromised, what deals should be made, and what should be demanded from Washington in return.
The prospect of the China-US trade war remains a sword of Damocles suspended over the Chinese economy. Despite a 5.3% growth rate in the first half of this year, and domestic consumption contributing over 50% to that growth, China’s economic recovery is far from solid. Official data released last week showed the July manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) at just 49.3 — marking the fourth consecutive month below the boom-bust line.
To put it bluntly, resisting the risks and shocks brought about by the US, whilst addressing the challenges of domestic economic transformation, would be the focus over these five years.
With the uncertainty surrounding tariff negotiations, coupled with overly ramped-up exports in the first half of 2025, it is expected that there would be regression for foreign trade. After the phasing out of the trade-in policy, the revitalisation of domestic demand might not be sustainable. The major age-old obstacle that is the real estate market remains in a state of flux with no sign of rock bottom, while the pulling effect of emerging industries is not sufficient as a replacement — the Chinese leadership would likely not dare to take their eye off the economy.
Before entering “Beidaihe time”, the Politburo — as is customary — met in the last week of July. On top of discussing the state of the economy, it was also decided that the fourth plenum would be convened in Beijing in October, to deliberate on suggestions for the formulation of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030).
In the words of the officials, the 15th Five-Year Plan period is described as “a crucial phase for consolidating the foundation and making all-round efforts to basically realise socialist modernisation”. Chinese officials also assessed that “China’s development is facing profound and complex changes, as strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent and uncertainties and unforeseen factors are rising”.
To put it bluntly, resisting the risks and shocks brought about by the US, whilst addressing the challenges of domestic economic transformation, would be the focus over these five years. How well this is done would determine whether China can realise socialist modernisation by 2035. The direction and blueprint for this endeavour would require total consensus among the top leadership.
The fourth plenum is also expected to address several significant personnel issues, which could be discussed during “Beidaihe time”. There are currently a few unresolved cases among the upper echelons of the CCP.
Leadership issues
The fourth plenum is also expected to address several significant personnel issues, which could be discussed during “Beidaihe time”. There are currently a few unresolved cases among the upper echelons of the CCP.
For instance, the nature of Ma Xingrui’s next appointment, following his stepping down as Xinjiang party secretary over a month ago, has not yet been determined. Similarly, the investigation results and handling of feedback concerning Miao Hua, who fell from grace last November and was removed from his Central Military Commission (CMC) position, have also not been officially announced.
More strikingly, He Weidong, a CMC vice-chairman and Politburo member, has been absent for nearly five months without an official explanation. Authorities might unveil details concerning his situation, along with the Miao case, after the Victory Day parade on 3 September and before the fourth plenum.
If He is indeed in trouble, as external observers speculate, the 20th CMC would be reduced from seven members in October 2022 to four, accounting for the earlier removals of former Defence Minister Li Shangfu and Miao. The 24-member Politburo would also lose a member due to He's alleged downfall.
Whether the authorities will adjust the CMC at the fourth plenum — such as promoting Liu Zhenli or Zhang Shengmin from CMC members to vice-chairmen, or promoting Dong Jun who previously took over as defence minister to a member of the CMC — or whether there would be a rare replacement to the Politburo which is supposedly down a member, these would all be focal points for the fourth plenum.
Historically, over the past two decades, Central Committee plenary sessions have seen more frequent adjustments to the CMC than additions to the Politburo. However, at this critical juncture, with the anti-corruption storm continuing to brew within the People’s Liberation Army and the “pernicious influences” (流毒) yet to be fully eradicated, the leadership is unlikely to rush promotions without complete confidence. This “Beidaihe time” would allow top leaders to briefly set aside daily affairs and carefully deliberate on personnel deployment and selection issues.
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